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Abstract
In the last two decades, technological progress and a decrease in trade barriers fostered the
formation of global value chains, in which di¤erent sequences of production stages, previously per-
formed in close proximity, can now be unbundled globally. In this contribution we test at the rm
level the optimal allocation of ownership rights along a productive sequence, as in the framework
set by Antras and Chor (2013). For this purpose we exploit an own-built dataset made of 4,214
parents which have acquired or established at least one a¢liate in the period 2004-2012. Overall,
they control 104,720 a¢liates and operate in 185 countries. Assuming a technological orientation
of the value chain from the nal consumer upwards, we positively test that incentives to integrate
suppliers vary systematically with: i) the relative upstream or downstream position of the a¢liate
with respect to the parent; ii) the elasticity of demand faced by the parent. Further, we nd new
insights for rm-level heterogeneity along supply chains, as more productive and bigger parent
companies are more likely to choose a¢liates next to the nal consumer. Once controlling for the
complexity of the internal supply chain at the moment the investment decisions occur, we nd that
bigger internal chains show a lower propensity to integrate at the margin, probably discounting
increasing coordination costs. Results are robust after di¤erent specications. However, we detect
some non-linearities over rm-level distributions, when integrated a¢liates approach the bottom of
the supply chain, next to the nal consumer, after the VIII decile of the a¢liates downstreamness.
In this case we presume that a horizontal rather than a vertical integration strategy could prevail.
Keywords: global value chains, vertical integration, property rights theory, multinational enter-
prises, downstreamness, business groups.
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1 Introduction
Since the late 80s, technological progress and a decrease in trade barriers have fostered the formation of
cross-border sequences of productive stages undertaken by rms along virtually international assembly
lines1. From the product design to the distribution to consumers, all intermediate stages of production
can involve networks of rms that are dispersed in several countries. Each production stage can be
eventually organized by a company in two alternative ways, either keeping the input production within
its boundaries, in case of standard vertical integration, or outsourcing it and engaging in arms length
contracts. Thereby, the ordered sequence of all production stages makes a chain with some suppliers
that are integrated or not within one or more companies productive boundaries.
The aim of this contribution is to test for the organization of these Global Value Chains (GVCs)
at the rm-level, as sequences of intermediate stages that are subject to contractual frictions. In this
context, the nal and optimal allocation of ownership rights along the sequence can depend both on
the relative position of each intermediate producer, and on the surplus that can be extracted from
the sale of the nal output, on which all the producers along the chain can rely. Here we adopt and
test the theoretical framework set by Antràs and Chor (2013), whose main proposition predicts that
if the demand elasticity for the nal output is su¢ciently elastic, vertical integration occurs for the
stages of the supply chain that are more proximate to the nal consumer. We nd conrmation of this
main prediction, but we also provide evidence of some non-linearities, once the full range of demand
elasticity is exploited and the parent company approaches the bottom of the supply chain. Results are
robust to several specications, also controlling for the simultaneity bias that could possibly arise after
including in the same sample newly integrated a¢liates and long-established corporate structures.
Moreover, we are able to detect rm-level heterogeneity in vertical integration strategies along the
value chain. We nd that the more productive and larger parents are able to pick a¢liates located
relatively downstream. Also, conditional on past choices of integration, we nd that more productive
parents integrate less likely further stages of production. Similarly, parents already controlling complex
supply chains show a lower propensity to integrate further intermediate producers as they have to
discount increasing internal coordination costs.
For the purpose of our empirical analysis we exploit an own-built database of domestic and multi-
national Business Groups (BGs), following the methodology set in Altomonte and Rungi (2013), for
which the observation unit is a parent company that organizes several a¢liates through a form of
hierarchical control. Hence, we complement our rm-level data with metrics of downstreamness and
demand elasticity sourced respectively by Antràs and Chor (2013) and Broda and Weinstein (2006).
For example, consider the case of two BGs present in our dataset: Sony and Johnson & Johnson.
We report these two case studies in Tables 1 and 2. The rst is a group originated in Japan and
primarily focused on electronics manufacturing, whereas the second is a US multinational producing
medical devices and pharmaceutical products. From our data both exhibit similar degrees of parent
downstreamness, but face very di¤erent average demand elasticities and hence very di¤erent vertical
integration propensities. Both BGs have a similar group size, as they control 405 and 353 a¢liates
respectively and, when looking at their parent outputs, they are among the most downstream in our
sample (:87 and :92), but nal consumers tend to be much less price sensitive in the case of Sony
(elasticity around 4:79) than in the case of Johnson & Johnson (elasticity around 12:72). Accordingly,
the average a¢liates downstreamness is :50 for Sony and :71 for Johnson & Johnson. That is, when
the demand is su¢ciently elastic, vertical integration preferably occurs downstream, leaving potential
outsourcing of inputs further upstream2.
Our empirical framework allows the decision making center, i.e. the parent rm, to locate in any
of the production stages, as we collect all rms activities along the chain (Ramondo et al., 2015),
1See Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2014) and previously Hummels et al. (2001) for a discussion of the relevance of
the phenomenon and of the structural economic changes it entails.
2These correlations are systematic in our data. For example, when we take two smaller groups. Seachange Inter-
national Inc., primarily active in computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing, controls 11 a¢liates and has a
downstream parent (:92) that faces a relatively low demand elasticity (4:77). Ashok Leyland, an Indian automobile
manufacturing, controls 10 a¢liates and still has a very downstream parent (:94), but in this case it faces a much higher
demand elasticity (84:19) for the nal output. Consistently with the above results the average a¢liates downstreamness
is relatively lower for the former (:53) than for the latter (:68).
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Table 1: A case of sequential substitutes (low demand elasticity)
0 0.5 1
Sony
Integration Outsourcing
(Affiliate)
Table 2: A case of sequential complements (high demand elasticity)
0 0.7 1
J&J
Outsourcing Integration
(Affiliate)
controlling also for potential rm-level heterogeneity from nancial accounts. Thus, we can make
reference to the relative positioning as opposed to the absolute position of each parent company in
relationship to vertical integration choices. Indeed, based on preliminary evidence from our sample, we
nd that parent companies can be often located up in the supply chain, in violation of the assumption
by the Antràs and Chor (2013) model that places the decision making centers always at the bottom,
where consumers buy a nal product. Nonetheless, we argue that our empirical evidence shows that
the main tenet of the theoretical framework is still valid, but until the VII or VIII deciles of the a¢liate
positioning, depending on the downstreamness metrics we adopt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey review previous liter-
ature. Section 3 introduces the construction of our sample and the variables used in our econometric
investigations. In Section 4 we present di¤erent empirical specications and robustness checks. Finally
Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Several works investigated the determinants of cross-border vertical integration, i.e. the global decision
to make or buy, as giving rise to intra-rm transactions. Among others, Antràs (2003) revealed why
intra-rm trade is mainly concentrated in capital intensive industries and between capital abundant
countries, while Antràs and Helpman (2004) argued that only the most productive among them are able
to sustain higher sunk costs of international vertical integration in a context of heterogeneous rms,
and that would explain the positive correlation existing between intra-rm trade and productivity
dispersions. These theoretical models were generalized by Antràs and Helpman (2008) in order to
accommodate for varying degrees of contractual frictions, nding that better contracting institutions
in the suppliers country of origin let o¤shoring strategies prevail3. With a broader perspective,
Acemoglu et al. (2007) were the rst to consider the possibility that unique headquarters have to
commit to contracts with several suppliers, in this way extending in scope the one-shot make or buy
decision. Eventually, they show that a greater contractual incompleteness leads to the adoption of
less advanced technologies, even more when intermediate inputs are highly complementary.
3For a review of rms organization strategies and trade, see Antràs and Yeaple (2014).
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Based on empirical ndings, we can distinguish two main strands of literature.
On one hand, Nunn and Treer (2008) and Nunn and Treer (2013) have a primary indus-
try/product focus when examining the determinants of U.S. imports share that occurs intra-rm.
They conrm a logic of property-rights theories in the case of multinational rms: vertical integra-
tion prevails when non-contractible headquarters inputs are more relevant and productivity is higher.
Similarly, Bernard et al. (2010) nd that intra-rm trade mainly occurs for skill-intensive products
from developing countries but for capital-intensive products from advanced countries.
On the other hand, when exploiting rm level data, Tomiura (2007) and Kohler and Smolka
(2012) document the well-known productivity premia associated with multinational enterprises, this
time di¤erentiating by sourcing strategies: foreign outsourcers and exporters tend to be less productive
than the rms active in FDI or involved in multiple globalization modes, but they are more productive
than purely domestic rms. There is also evidence that for the most productive multinationals the
chance of trading with an independent supplier is higher when they intensively use relationship-specic
inputs, as in Defever and Toubal (2013). In addition, Corcos et al. (2013) support the prediction that
intra-rm imports are more likely in capital- and skill-intensive rms, in highly productive rms and
from countries with a good rule of law, whereas Acemoglu et al. (2009) register a greater propensity
to vertically integrate in hosting countries where one can nd both higher contracting costs and a
more favorable nancial environment. Also, as shown by Alfaro and Charlton (2009), a great share of
intra-rm trade occurs already from within the same industry and Alfaro et al. (2013) ascertain that
higher market prices lead to a greater propensity to vertically integrate.
However, none of the previous works consider the sequential nature of production as a¤ecting loca-
tion and organizational decisions by multinational enterprises. First e¤orts in this direction are made
by Harms et al. (2012), who consider a particular sequence of stages and a non-monotonic variations
of transportation costs along the chain to show the trade-o¤ faced by rms between o¤shoring and
domestic production. Moreover, Costinot et al. (2013) develop a theoretical model for which asupply
chain is ordered following the ideal standardization content of production, with more standardized
stages entailing a lower content of knowledge and hence a higher country growth potential. Their aim
is to prove how country patterns of specialization can have consequences on income distribution on a
world scale.
We instead choose to exploit the framework proposed by Antràs and Chor (2013), where the authors
draw a property-rights model of rms boundaries, dissecting the optimal allocation of ownership
rights in a context where production processes are sequential and contracts between a nal producer
and its suppliers are all potentially incomplete. Di¤erently from previous works, they introduce a
technological ordering in production stages, so that one stage can commence only when intermediate
inputs from upstream stages are complete. This is a noteworthy advance in the comprehension of
the organization of Global Value Chains, since their model design is capable to proxy an actual
productive environment in which a rm and its suppliers have to bargain sequentially, but on the
basis of an expected surplus that is realized only after the sale of the nal good, at the end of all
production stages. In this sequential context the authors introduce the classic trade-o¤ faced by each
supplier, who has to undertake a relation-specic investment in order to provide a customized input
that is partially non-contractible. Hence, contractual incompleteness leads the nal good producer,
who owns residual control rights in case of integration, to enhance its bargaining power in case of a
contractual breach. However, as in similar frameworks, the strategy of vertical integration reduces the
suppliers incentives to invest in the productive relationship.
The key novelty is that there exists a dependence among all production stages because the relation-
specic investment made by upstream suppliers a¤ects also the incentives to invest in more downstream
stages. If an investment made by a supplier increases the value of the marginal product, production
stages can be labelled sequential complements, and it occurs when the price elasticity of nal-good
demand is higher than the value of the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent inputs. Conversely, if
a supplier perceives a diminished product value, we have the case of sequential substitutes, in which
the demand elasticity of the nal good is su¢ciently low. Therefore, inputs are sequential comple-
ments (substitutes) only if the elasticity of nal good demand is higher (lower) than the elasticity of
substitution across the intermediates provided by the di¤erent suppliers.
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At the time of writing, a preliminary successful attempt to test at the rm-level this framework is
done in Alfaro et al. (2015), although with more limited information in terms of sample coverage and
not controlling for rm-level heterogeneity, after aggregating a¢liates information at the industry-
level.
In the following analysis, coherently with our choice of a theoretical reference, we positively test
the propensity towards vertical integration along sequential production stages by parents acquiring
control over companies, identifying complements and substitutes cases and introducing controls for
rm heterogeneity. Thereafter, we detect some non-linearities at the bottom of the supply chain, once
the full distribution of a¢liates downstreamness and parent elasticity is exploited.
3 Sample construction
As we are interested in studying the determinants of organization of production stages by a parent
company, the sample we build comprises networks of a¢liates whose economic activity is coordinated
by a single ultimate owner, that we consider as headquarter. In this we rely on a methodological
framework set by Altomonte and Rungi (2013), according to which the observation unit is a set of
a¢liates including its headquarters, whose units can be located either in the country of origin of the
parent or abroad, and that are controlled after reaching an absolute majority threshold for direct and
indirect equity participation. The benet of adopting a network approach resides in the possibility to
take into account both direct control, when majority of votes is reached directly at the parent-level,
and indirect control, when a¢liates exert control on other sub-a¢liates. The phenomenon of cross-
participations is often neglected in other empirical works4. Here we follow international standards
(OECD, 2005; EUROSTAT, 2007; UNCTAD, 2009) to set a control threshold at absolute majority of
stakes ( 50:01%). Hence, for our purpose, we elaborate data from two original sources: we retrieve
M&A deals occurred in the period 2004 to 2012 from the Zephyr Database and we complement
this information with data on networks of a¢liates existing in 2012, as sourced from the Ownership
Database contained in Orbis5, from where we collect also rm-level nancial accounts, when available,
and incorporation dates.
After combining information from acquisitions and takeovers, on the basis of incorporation and
acquisition dates, we are able to separate between a stock and a ow of a¢liates that can help us in
determining the choice of integrating production stages also as a function of the already established
internal supply chains, possibly developed over a very long span of time.
As we report in Table 3, we end up with a main sample made of 4,214 manufacturing parents
controlling a total of 104,720 a¢liates in 185 countries. Of these, 71,011 a¢liates are incumbent,
whereas 33,709 are new a¢liates in a productive network after 2004 and until 2012.
Since the main target of our analysis is the organization of production sequences before reaching
a nal consumer, we exclude from our analysis parent companies that are mainly active in primary or
services industries, i.e. their nal output is not a manufactured product6. Still, vertically integrated
supply chains in our nal sample can rely on service inputs, provided by a¢liates throughout the
entire production network.
The rich structure of our data allows controlling for a possible endogenous formation of internal
value chains, with parents integrating activities but conditional on already established productive
networks. For this purpose we will introduce a control function approach, taking advantage of the
information about a¢liates that were integrated before 2004, as reported in the third column of
4A¢liates can participate with their own portfolio of stakes in determining the total allocation of property rights on
top of the parent company. Eventually, the object of analysis becomes a Business Group, made of at least two formally
autonomous legal entities that are coordinated by a unique parent, which can develop very complex organizational
structures. For more details on the procedure and its benets, see Altomonte and Rungi (2013).
5Both sources we use are compiled by Bureau van Dijk, a consultancy rm collecting companies information for
business intelligence. All in all, Zephyr contains information on over one million deals while Orbis includes up-to-date
information for over 120 million rms worldwide.
6We detect about 223,167 parents that are mainly involved in primary or services industries, which can have invested
or not in the period of our analyses (2004-2012). Preliminary analysis shows that a relative majority of them includes
small nance and consulting rms, construction and transportation companies.
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Table 3. Indeed, many groups of rms present in our data can report even century-old traditions
of productive activity, going farther back any measured variable we can include as a control in our
empirical specications.
Table 3: Sample coverage I: Parents and a¢liates.
Parents All affiliates
Affiliates as
before 2004­2012
Newly integrated
affiliates
(A+B) (A) (B)
Manufacturing parents 4,214 104,720 71,011 33,709
(investors in 2004­2012)
Table 4: Sample coverage II: Main geographic regions.
Parents All affiliates
Affiliates as
before 2004­2012
Newly integrated
affiliates
(A+B) (A) (B)
OECD 3,371 88,041 60,867 27,174
non­OECD 843 16,679 10,144 6,535
European Union 1,421 58,508 40,620 17,888
United States 1,407 18,005 10,592 7,413
Rest of the world 1,386 28,207 19,799 8,408
of which:
Japan 285 7,079 5,986 1,093
Latin America 50 2,539 1,727 812
Middle East 47 1,002 642 360
China 154 2,113 1,293 820
Africa 24 1,448 1,072 376
ASEAN 211 2,748 2,035 713
To ta l 4,214 104,720 71,011 33,709
In Table 4 we provide a geographic coverage of our main sample by some countries/areas where
we validate the existence of a high ows concentration between capital-abundant countries, a crucial
feature detected also in several works when looking at related-parties trade data. Parents are classied
by their home country in the second column, while in the third column we report the total number of
a¢liates owned by those parents, either as a stock before 2004 or as investment operations undertaken
after 2004, respectively reported in column 4 and in column 5 of Table 4.
As expected, the majority of our internal supply chains originate in OECD countries (80%), whose
a¢liates represent around 85% (88,041 out of 104,720) of our nal sample. Of these, 27,174 are new
acquisitions. In addition, EU countries report the largest number of parents (34%) and a¢liates (55%),
with two thirds of them already integrated in the past, while in US we nd about 1,400 parents (32%)
which control 18,005 a¢liates7.
7To validate our dataset we can mainly rely on Altomonte and Rungi (2013), from which we borrow the data method-
6
From our sample, a representative parent controls on average 24:87 a¢liates, it is active in 6
countries and started its activity on average in 1983. However, distributions are rather skewed since
the median parent controls only 5 a¢liates present in 2 countries. About 63% of our sample is made
of multinational groups, i.e. networks coordinated by a parent that report at least one foreign a¢liate.
Yet, we keep also entirely domestic groups, for which all a¢liates are located in the parents country of
origin, as a further control group, assuming that parents can choose to develop supply chains entirely
at home.
For the purpose of our analysis we link rms activity information with industry-level metrics
of demand elasticity and downstreamness. The rst we source from Broda and Weinstein (2006),
assuming that for su¢ciently high (low) values of this average demand elasticity the corresponding
elasticity of substitution across inputs is low (high)8.
As for downstreamness metrics, we source directly from Antràs and Chor (2013), according to
which the relative location of an industry in production processes is measured as the distance from nal
consumers, thus giving an orientation to technological processes over di¤erent stages of production,
eventually leading to production of nal goods. Hence, downstreamness metrics are normalized on a
range in [0; 1], where 1 represents full proximity to nal demand and 0 is the beginning of a production
line.
In absence of original information on actual shipments of intermediate inputs, these metrics turn
to 2002 US Input-Output tables produced by US Census Bureau in order to obtain average measures
of the relative position of each industry in the production processes9. We exploit both alternative
metrics of downstreamness: the rst is built as the ratio of the aggregate direct use of an input to the
aggregate total use of that industry (DuseTuse), whereas the second weighs for the average position
of that industry in the supply chain at which an industrial output is used (DownMeasure).
After merging with our rm-level sample, in Table 5 we report the ten highest and lowest values
of DuseTuse and DownMeasure across the 473 manufacturing industries we observe at the 6-digit of
the NAICS rev.2007. The industries featuring the lowest downstreamness values tend to be in raw
materials processing (aluminium, petrochemical, or copper), whereas industries with highest values
are footwear and automobile manufacturing. In Table 5, the two alternative measures share ve out
of ten bottom industries and six out of top ten industries in our rm-level sample.
Thus, for each parent and a¢liate along the control chain we have industry a¢liations at the 6-
digit NAICS rev.2007 classication, including both primary and secondary activities. After matching
downstreamness industry metrics with the 6-digit NAICS rev.2007 rms activities, we average over
parents and a¢liates primary activities to obtain their positioning along the supply chain. Indeed,
given the conglomerate nature of some groups of rms included in our sample, we may want exploit
information on the full set of activities performed by a company, which can be active in more than
one business or can be multiproduct in nature. Nevertheless, 90% of parent rms and 70% of a¢l-
iates in our sample present a single primary activity. In Table 6 and in Figure 1 and 2 we report
descriptive statistics and visualizations of downstreamness distributions from our rm-level sample.
The correction made originally from input-output tables on the DownMeasure, for the length of the
supply chain, is particularly evident when comparing distributions of either a¢liates or parents with
the values of DuseTuse metrics. The rst has a di¤erent support, at least from our rm-level sample,
as it starts at a higher value of :21. Also, both parents and a¢liates show a thicker left tail in the
DownMeasure distribution. As we will see in the following empirical analyses, this di¤erence will not
reect a substantial change in results for relative positioning of a parent with respect to its integrated
a¢liates.
In fact, we can already notice an important descriptive nding. In contradiction with the original
ology applied to the same data sources. There, the authors exploit a full dataset of all 270,474 active headquarters
controlling more than 1,500,000 (domestic and foreign) a¢liates worldwide in 2010. They check for value-added genera-
tion, then they validate the full sample after matching against the corresponding gures provided by (UNCTAD, 2011).
Correlations by country for parents and a¢liates are respectively :94 and :93.
8As in the industry-level investigation by Antràs and Chor (2013), we assume that any existing cross-sectoral variation
in input substitutability is largely uncorrelated with the elasticity of demand faced by the parent.
9The use of the US input-output table for the whole set of countries is justied by the assumption of a correlation
in inputs patterns across countries, assuming a common technology frontier, a Leontief production function and cross-
country factor price equalization (Acemoglu et al., 2009).
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Table 5: Highest and lowest values of downstreamness metrics from sample
NAICS code Industry label DuseTuse NAICS code Industry label Down
331314 Secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum .0000 325110 Petrochemical manufacturing .2150
325110 Petrochemical manufacturing .0599 331411 Primary smelting and refining of copper .2296
331411 Primary smelting and refining of copper .0741 331314 Secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum .2461
336112 Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing .0814 325191 Gum and wood chemical manufacturing .2595
325211 Electric housewares and household fan manufacturing .1205 325192 Cyclic crude and intermediate manufacturing .2595
325910 Printing ink manufacturing .1325 325193 Ethyl alcohol manufacturing .2595
311119 Other animal food manufacturing .1385 325199 All other basic organic chemical manufacturing .2595
333220 Plastics and rubber industry machinery manufacturing .1420 331312 Primary aluminum production .2622
331311 Aluminia refining .1447 331311 Alumina refining .2622
331312 Primary aluminium production .1447 325311 Nitrogenous fertilizer manufacturing .2658
337122 Nonupholstered wood household furniture .9922 336213 Motor home manufacturing .9879
339116 Dental laboratories .9942 316211 Rubber and plastics footwear manufacturing .9927
332992 Small arms ammunition manufacturing .9955 316212 House slipper manufacturing .9927
332993 Ammunition (except small arms) manufacturing .9955 316213 Men's footwear (except athletic) manufacturing .9927
316211 Rubber and plastics footwear manufacturing .9967 316214 Women's footwear (except athletic) manufacturing .9927
316212 House slipper manufacturing .9967 316219 Other footwear manufacturing .9927
316213 Men's footwear (except athletic) manufacturing .9967 337121 Upholstered household furniture manufacturing .9928
316214 Women's footwear (except athletic) manufacturing .9967 337122 Nonupholstered wood household furniture manufacturing .9948
316219 Other footwear manufacturing .9967 336112 Light truck and utility vehicle manufacturing .9995
336111 Automobile manufacturing .9997 336111 Automobile manufacturing .9997
Lowest 10 values Lowest 10 values
Highest 10 values Highest 10 values
assumption by Antràs and Chor (2013) model, in general a parent company does not perform as a
nal-good producer. As we detect in Table 6, an average parent has a downstreamness around :6.
That is, a parents initial and absolute positioning on a supply chain can be high and far from the
nal consumer before starting any sourcing decisions. Indeed, if we take as reference the unweighted
downstreamness (DuseTuse), it does range from a minimum of :07 to a maximum of :99 (from :23 to
:99 for the alternative Down metrics). Thus, we can argue that what really matters is the relative
(not absolute) positioning of the parent with respect to integrated stages of production, once taking as
exogenous the orientation of technological stages towards demand. On the other hand, parents tend
to own a¢liates that can operate both in industries that are downstream or upstream with respect to
the parent rms industry. Among others, this result is consistent with what Ramondo et al. (2015)
nd, for the huge span of activities possibly integrated by multinational corporations. In any case, a
generalization of the Antràs and Chor (2013) setup seems to be valid, since on average, the sample
of a¢liates show in Table 6 a slightly smaller downtreamness than sample parents in all moments of
sample distributions. In the following analyses we will see how our empirical strategies do conrm
these preliminary weak ndings, paving the way for a systematic analysis in terms of relative distances
between parents and a¢liates downstreamness and demand elasticity.
In Table 6 we further include descriptives of the demand elasticity after merging with rm-level
information, borrowing from Broda and Weinstein (2006)10. Here we elaborate on demand elasticity
to reproduce the notions of sequential substitutes and sequential complements already proposed by
Antràs and Chor (2013) in an industry-level analysis. Accordingly, we split the sample in two subsets
by the median elasticity value (i.e. 5:37) for all 437 manufacturing sectors present in our data. Hence,
10The use of the US import demand elasticities for the whole set of countries is justied by the assumption, made
also in other works, of broadly similar consumers preferences across countries. Further, we apply the same matching
procedure to rms activities as for the downstreamness metrics.
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we classify the above-median industries as complements and the below-median as substitutes cases.
Table 6: Downstreamness and elasticity across rms
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
DuseTuse 4,201 .63 .65 .22 .07 .99
Parents Down 4,201 .57 .56 .21 .23 .99
Rho 4,201 8.85 5.97 9.98 1.30 108.50
DuseTuse 90,928 .58 .54 .16 .01 1
Down 90,928 .52 .53 .18 .21 .99
Affiliates
Figure 1: Parent and a¢liate downstreamness from sample (DuseTuse metrics)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
a) Parent downstreamness (DuseTuse)
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
b) Affiliate downstreamness (DuseTuse)
Finally, in Table 7 we report summary statistics for a set of measures that in literature have been
identied as systematic determinants of the propensity to transact within rm boundaries. First, we
add parent level variables: labor productivity allows controlling for the regularity according to which
the most productive rms have the highest probability to invest abroad, as suggested by Antràs and
Helpman (2004) and Helpman et al. (2004), and so tend to integrate a larger interval of production
stages. Capital intensity of the parent is usually positively associated with intra-rm trade (Antràs,
2003). Firm size, age and number of already established a¢liates allow to control whether the largest
parents and the oldest parents are more prone to face the the sunk costs of a vertical integration
(Blomström and Lipsey, 1991), also in the case they hold already a multinational status (Greenaway
and Kneller, 2007). We further include the degree of contractibility for a¢liates activities (i.e. the
sellers industries), as based on the underlying share of products from an industry that are transacted
on organized exchanges or are reference-priced according to Rauch (1999) classication, hence poten-
tially calling for an easier deal to be reached when performed within a rms boundary (Nunn and
Treer, 2008). Two other country level variables sourced from the World Bank are instead associated
to a¢liates location: Rule of Law reects perceptions on the extent to which agents have condence
in and abide by the rules of the economy, and Entry Cost represents cost to start a business, as a
percentage of income per capita. In Data Appendix we provide further details for sources and usage
of these variables.
9
Figure 2: Parent and a¢liate downstreamness from sample (Down metrics)
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Table 7: Firm controls
Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
Parents
(Log of) labor productivity 2,438 4.32 1.10 ­3.82 11.72
(Log of) capital intensity 2,623 4.90 1.30 ­3.18 13.39
(Log of) size 3,140 6.80 2.35 0 12.81
Age 4,214 30 28 1 824
Number of affiliates 4,214 25 3 1 1071
Affiliates
Contractibility 46,630 .03 .12 0 1
Rule of Law 86,349 .74 .16 .13 .89
Entry Cost 85,564 1.50 1.56 ­6.91 7.63
4 Empirical strategies
4.1 Baseline
Our aim is to explain the position of an integrated a¢liate along a value chain as a function of a
parents downstreamness and its output demand elasticity. We start by testing the following baseline
equation augmented with rm, industry and country level information:
Xi(j)c = 0 + 1Xj + 2

j + 3(

j Xj) + 4Zi(j) + 5Wc + "i(j)c (1)
where Xi(j)c is the ith a¢liate downstreamness, alternatively measured as DuseTuse or DownMeasure
as from Antràs and Chor (2013), integrated by the jth parent and operaing in country c. Among
independent variables, Xj stands for jth parent downstreamness and 

j is a latent variable for parent
demand elasticity, that we interact (j  Xj) with the jth parent position along the supply chain.
Briey, with this baseline equation we start following the procedure set by Antràs and Chor (2013),
when making use of the original demand elasticity sourced by Broda and Weinstein (2006), in order to
split the sample into industries that can be considered sequential complements (with elasticity above
the median, j > med) and industries that can be considered sequential substitutes (with demand
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elasticity below the median, j < med ) over the value chain. As a result, our indicator 

j is a dummy
taking the value 1 in the complements cases and 0 for substitutes. Accordingly, we expect 3 > 0, as
parents would show a greater propensity to integrate suppliers that enter further downstream when
the nal demand is su¢ciently elastic. Zi(j) collects rm level control measures in logarithmic scale,
namely parent labor productivity, capital intensity, size, total number of controlled a¢liates, together
with a dummy variable for multinational status and nally an a¢liates degree of contractibility based
on its industrial activity. In Wc we collect two host country cs control measures, namely Rule of Law
and Entry Cost, sourced by the World Bank11.
Table 8: Baseline estimations, all a¢liates
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
affiliate downstreamness
(Du se Tu se  o r Do w n )
OLS
OLS and
firm
controls
OLS fe and
firm
controls
OLS
OLS and
firm
controls
OLS fe and
firm
controls
parent DuseTuse .150*** .224*** .231***
(.005) (.009) (.008)
parent Down .212*** .330*** .327***
(.005) (.010) (.008)
complements ­.040*** ­.055*** ­.062*** ­.022*** ­.007 ­.023***
(.004) (.007) (.006) (.003) (.006) (.005)
complements*parent DuseTuse .060*** .102*** .108***
(.005) (.011) (.009)
complements*parent Down .025*** .016 .043***
(.006) (.012) (.010)
(log of) labor productivity .009*** .007*** .015*** .013***
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.002)
(log of) capital intensity ­.011*** ­.008*** ­.021*** ­.020***
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001)
(log of) size .006*** .006*** .004*** .002***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
(log of) established affiliates ­.007*** ­.006*** ­.002** ­.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
(log of) age ­.006*** ­.004*** ­.007*** ­.008***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
multinational group ­.034*** ­.042*** ­.033*** ­.024***
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005)
contractibility ­.191*** ­.205*** ­.120*** ­.123***
(.010) (.009) (.007) (.006)
rule law ­.012 .006
(.008) (.008)
entry cost ­.004*** .001
(.001) (.001)
Constant .487*** .518*** .206*** .400*** .415*** .345***
(.003) (.012) (.013) (.003) (.012) (.011)
Observations 90,279 30,342 39,811 90,279 30,342 39,811
Adjusted R­squared .082 .158 .174 .073 .157 .174
Country fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Nested results for the baseline specication are reported in Table 8, where we nd a conrmation of
the theoretical prediction we were looking for: the higher the demand elasticity faced by a parent the
more downstream are its integrated suppliers when its relative positioning is taken into account. In all
specications we indeed show that the e¤ect of parent downstreamness is positive and signicant at
the 1% level in case of sequential complements. The nding is robust to inclusion of both alternative
metrics for downstreamness.
11For further details on data sources and elaborations on variables, see Data Appendix.
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Further, we nd that parents tend to control production stages proximate to their main activity.
Each parent and its suppliers tend to be relatively close along a value chain, as the higher the parent
downstreamness the higher also the a¢liates downstreamness. This novel result is conrmed also
when we include rm-level controls and host country xed e¤ects. We argue that what we nd here
can be discussed also in connection with Atalay et al. (2014), who report that after the acquisition
an a¢liate and a parent are very similar along multiple dimensions. In the US case, they nd that
vertical ownership does not seem to increase ex post the level of actual shipments among productive
establishments. Hence, the authors suggest that an omitted variable bias could be responsible for their
counterintuitive nding, as it is not possible to control for unobserved exchanges of intangible inputs,
which can instead be the rationale for new vertical acquisitions.
We rather argue that the nding of Atalay et al. (2014) could su¤er from another di¤erent omitted
variable bias that the authors do not consider, namely the a¢liates relative positioning along the
chain that can be the same before and after the acquisition. Indeed, if the sequential setup of the
Antràs and Chor (2013) model is true, and we believe in our previous nding, both an a¢liate and
its proximate parent would show similar levels of downstreamness, before and after the acquisition,
as the overall propensity to exchange physical intermediate inputs would be already given by the ex
ante peculiarity of the production stage they perform.
Interestingly, productivity and size are positively related to our dependent variable, which reveals
that the more productive and larger parents pick more likely a¢liates located next to the nal con-
sumer, while older parents seem more prone to integrate upstream stages of production. We will see
however in Section 4.2 that the correlation with parent age is not resilient to controls for simultaneity
bias, when mixing up together old established a¢liates and newly integrated ones. Similarly, also the
negative correlation between a¢liate downstreamness and total number of integrated a¢liates will
vanishes when we will perfom an endogenous treatment model.
Since sample construction we kept on purpose both domestic and multinational groups of rms, as
we rationally assume a company can also choose to develop a supply chain entirely at home. Hence,
a dummy variable for the multinational status controls whether a di¤erent vertical strategy occurs
when crossing national borders at least once. Here we nd that groups having at least one activity
abroad are more likely to integrate upstream production stages. In addition, we check for di¤erent
combinations of factors of production that eventually relates to value chain positioning, by adding
a measure of headquarters capital-intensity. Our central result does not change, but we nd that a
higher capital intensity is associated with stages of production farther up from nal consumers.
Nonetheless, the companys choice of organizational mode can be a¤ected by external institutional
environments, especially when its boundaries extend across di¤erent countries and/or industries. To
test if our results are robust over geographic and industrial extensions, we included both country
proxies of contractual environment and implicit contractual frictions for a¢liates industries. Not
surprisingly, we nd that higher levels of inputs contractibility are negatively correlated with a¢li-
ates downstreamness. As from the original calculation of the contractibility proxy by Rauch (1999),
upstream stages are more likely to be reference-priced and/or traded on an organized exchange, thus
they are more easily contractible12. This is consistent with an increased propensity by the parent to
integrate upstream stages if parties could specify better their respective rights and duties (Antràs and
Helpman, 2008). Less intuitive seems the negative correlation between a¢liates downstreamness and
host countries entry cost.
Lastly, we nd that the overall quality of institutions, here proxied by the country rule of law, is
not signicantly related to a¢liates positioning along the chain.
All our results are robust in signicance and signs when we introduce the alternative metric for
downstreamness (Down), which takes into account the length of the chain after adopting a weighing
system by production stages, in columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 8.
12We report results for inputs contractibility using the conservative classication in Rauch (1999), where inputs are
di¤erentiated and/or reference-priced. The magnitude of the a¢liates contractibility coe¢cient is higher under the more
liberal classication the author proposes. Results are available upon request.
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Further, main results are also robust to sample composition e¤ects. In Table 9 we test our full
specication rst after excluding purely horizontal strategies, for a¢liates positioned at the same level
of the parent (i.e. a¢liates reporting the same level of downstreamness), then restricting our sample to
manufacturing inputs in order to avoid measurement problems in services industries. Additionally, in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 9, we proceed testing if our results are also robust when we take into account
only the a¢liates that are located more upstream than the parent, whereas in the last two columns
we exclusively control for newly established a¢liates. In all these cases we nd conrmation of our
main prediction, according to which parents tend to integrate more downstream a¢liates once facing
sequential complement case. Only in the case of excluding stages that are more downstream than the
parent, we register shaky results for correlations with parent size and multinational status. The latter
should not come as a surprise, as we are deliberately excluding from our sample an important part of
the a¢liates actual distribution over the supply chain.
Table 9: Variants on sample composition
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS with
DuseTuse
OLS with
Down
OLS with
DuseTuse
OLS with
Down
OLS with
DuseTuse
OLS with
Down
OLS with
DuseTuse
OLS with
Down
excluding
horizontal
excluding
horizontal
manufacturing
affiliates only
manufacturing
affiliates only
upstream
affiliates only
upstream
affiliates only
new affiliates
only
new affiliates
only
parent DuseTuse .063*** .314*** .502*** .167***
(.009) (.011) (.012) (.018)
parent Down .203*** .428*** .387*** .260***
(.010) (.011) (.010) (.018)
complements ­.080*** ­.019*** ­.050*** ­.011* ­.051*** ­.037*** ­.077*** ­.028**
(.007) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.010) (.006) (.013) (.012)
complements*parent DuseTuse .124*** .090*** .094*** .140***
(.011) (.013) (.014) (.021)
complements*parent Down .013 .026** .043*** .051**
(.012) (.013) (.012) (.022)
(log of) labor productivity .002 .012*** .010*** .012*** .003 .005*** .011*** .017***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
(log of) capital intensity ­.009*** ­.023*** ­.009*** ­.016*** ­.013*** ­.012*** ­.012*** ­.020***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003)
(log of) size .005*** .004*** .008*** .002** .002** .001 .007*** .003**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
(log of) established affiliates ­.005*** ­.002* ­.007*** ­.001 ­.007*** .001 ­.012*** ­.005***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
(log of) age .001 ­.004*** ­.008*** ­.008*** ­.007*** ­.001 ­.002 ­.005**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
multinational group ­.024*** ­.027*** ­.038*** ­.020*** .001 ­.006 ­.002 ­.005
(.007) (.008) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007)
contractibility ­.252*** ­.169*** ­.117*** ­.093*** ­.095*** ­.030*** ­.203*** ­.132***
(.011) (.007) (.010) (.008) (.011) (.006) (.020) (.013)
rule law ­.011 .019** .001 ­.001 .003 .028*** .009 .014
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.013) (.014)
entry cost ­.005*** .000 ­.005*** ­.002*** ­.005*** .001 ­.004*** ­.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Constant .605*** .481*** .448*** .375*** .241*** .218*** .508*** .412***
(.013) (.014) (.015) (.014) (.015) (.012) (.021) (.021)
Observations 25,352 25,352 23,293 23,293 13,217 13,818 8,404 8,404
Adjusted R­squared .080 .084 .199 .240 .372 .318 .157 .125
Country fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
affiliate downstreamness
(Du se Tu s e  o r Do w n )
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.2 Endogenous integration
We now turn to investigate the possible endogenous formation of value chains, when including in the
same sample investment decisions undertaken over a long span of time, but controlling only for parent
features measured with reference to the last decade, for when we have available information.
We argue that this empirical problem can be worked out with a binary control function approach13,
eventually exploring how new integration choices can be a¤ected by parent features and already
established vertical chains.
For this purpose, we are able to separate from our sample the investment choices made in the period
2004 to 2012, for which we have contemporary observations of parent companies characteristics, from
the a¢liates already controlled by the same parent companies but before the investment decision,
which we take as a control group.
We make use of a control treatment function at a rst step represented by a probit equation as
follows:
di(j) = 0 + 1Zj + "i(j) (2)
where di(j) is a binary variable equal to 1 if the ith a¢liate is integrated after 2004 by the jth parent
and 0 otherwise. Zj represents parent-level control measures, namely number of already established
a¢liates, labor productivity, capital intensity, size and age, all in logarithmic scale.
Thereby, the outcome equation borrows from our baseline in eq. 1, as follows:
Xi(j)c = 0 + 1Xj + 2

j + 3(

j Xj) + 4Zi(j) + 5Wc + 6di(j) + "i(j)c (3)
to which we add the same binary variable di(j) as in 2, this time as a further regressor. Its coe¢-
cients will eventually return us the average treatment e¤ect (ATE) on a¢liate positioning over the
supply chain. Our specication allows netting out in the outcome equation the simultaneous e¤ect
of endogenous parents characteristics, as they can already be the result of past integration choices.
Errors are clustered by parent companies and the procedure we perform adopts maximum likelihood
estimation. In Table 10 and 11 we report results respectively for treatment and outcome, for both
alternative measures of downstreamness, with and without hosting country xed e¤ects.
Preliminarly, we observe that the choice of controlling for endogenous formation of supply chains,
conditional on already established a¢liates is successful, as the estimated correlation (rho) in Table
11, between the errors of the treatment equation and the errors of the outcome equation is statistically
signicant and high in magnitude, relatively higher when we use the DownMeasure metrics. The Wald
test rejects the null hypothesis of the independence of the outcome from the treatment equations.
In any case, the main theoretical prediction of the framework set by Antràs and Chor (2013) is still
conrmed, as in the outcome of Table 10 the interaction term between parent downstreamness and its
demand elasticity is positive and statistically signicant. The higher the demand elasticity faced by a
parent, the more downstream are its integrated suppliers, when its relative positioning is taken into
account. Only in the third specication, its coe¢cient and the coe¢cient on the complements dummy
variable are not signicant, albeit they align to previous estimates when controlling for country xed
e¤ects in the last column of Table 10.
Interestingly, even after controlling for simultaneity bias, we conrm that more productive and
bigger parents are able to reach more downstream production stages, proximate to the nal consumer.
Rather, as expected, some parent characteristics are now not signicantly correlated with a¢liate
positioning on the chain. Something that we already anticipated in the previous section, as there was
a suspect of endogeneity. Especially in the case of parent age and size of its production network, an
endogeneous mechanism is particularly evident. An older group had time to become bigger, collecting
more a¢liates as a consequence of past choices of vertical integration. Eventually, in Table 10, we
13For a comparison among di¤erent possible treatment-outcome estimators, see Angrist (2001), Vella and Verbeek
(1999) or Heckman et al. (2003). Although consensus is not reached on the most promising among competing approaches,
authors agree on the similarity of estimates that are eventually obtained. Here we follow the methodology originally
introduced by Heckman (1997).
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Table 10: Present and past choices of integration, outcome equation from endogenous treatment (to
be continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Endogenous
treatment
Endogenous
treatment fe
Endogenous
treatment
Endogenous
treatment fe
Outcome equation
Dependent variable:
affiliate downstreamness (DuseTuse or
Down)
parent DuseTuse .224*** .231***
(.036) (.032)
parent Down .316*** .316***
(.026) (.026)
complements ­.055** ­.062*** ­.010 ­.026***
(.028) (.025) (.017) (.005)
complements*parent DuseTuse .101** .108***
(.044) (.040)
complements*parent Down .018 .047***
(033) (.009)
(log of) labor productivity .014*** .011** .026*** .022***
(.005) (.041) (.005) (.004)
(log of) capital intensity ­.013** ­.010** ­.025*** ­.024***
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.004)
(log of) size .011*** .009*** .013*** .010***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
(log of) established affiliates ­.006 ­.004 ­.001 .003
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
(log of) age ­.003 ­.002 ­.002 ­.005
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
multinational group ­.016 ­.020** ­.015 ­.004
(.010) (.009) (.010) (.010)
contractibility ­.192*** ­.204*** ­.118*** ­.120***
(.031) (.027) (.024) (.020)
rule law ­.014 .004
(.013) (.012)
entry cost ­.004*** ­.001
(.001) (.001)
newly integrated (Yes/No) .120*** .103*** .244*** .242***
(.021) (.020) (.016) (.016)
Constant .392*** .348*** .177*** .181***
(.052) (.074) (.035) (.055)
Cluster standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
nd that the average downstreamness is higher for newly integrated a¢liates, as the coe¢cient on
the treatment dummy for new and old investment operations is positive and signicant. Briey, there
is a substantial di¤erence, previously undetected, between the stock of the a¢liates and the new
investment decisions, as regards their actual positioning on the supply chain, which we cannot fully
account for with more recent variables.
Nonetheless, we can exploit some further information from Table 11, with respect to parent-level
characteristics and their investment decisions over the period of analysis. Bigger and more productive
parents integrated less likely new stages of production in our period of analysis, conditional on the
stock of a¢liates whose production stages they are already able to control.
Similarly, groups of rms already collecting a higher number of a¢liates chose less likely further
vertical integration. In other words, already big production networks show a lower propensity to add
further stages of production to their already complex supply chains, probably after discounting higher
internal coordination costs than smaller supply chains developed by parents collecting less a¢liates.
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Table 11: Past and present choices of vertical integration, treatment equation (continues)
Treatment equation
Treatment variable:
newly integrated Yes/No
(log of) established affiliates ­.039** ­.050*** ­.034** ­.047***
(.016) (.016) (.015) (.015)
(log of) labor productivity ­.114*** ­.088*** ­.123*** ­.097***
(.030) (.026) (.029) (.025)
(log of) capital intensity .027 .039 .041 .051**
(.030) (.025) (.029) (.024)
(log of) size ­.118*** ­.095*** ­.122*** ­.098***
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
(log of) age ­.065*** ­.075*** ­.054*** ­.066***
(.018) (.016) (.015) (.015)
Constant 1.386*** 1.124*** 1.329*** 1.560***
(.144) (.126) (.135) (.021)
rho ­.391*** ­.331*** ­.703*** ­.698***
sigma .186*** .185*** .211*** .210***
lambda ­.073*** ­.061*** ­.148*** ­.147***
Observations 30,340 39,808 30,340 39,808
Log pseudolikelihood ­7,859.082 ­11,340.352 ­7,159.00 ­.11,275.876
Wald test for independent equations 35.30*** 31.14*** 211.33*** 221.96***
Clustered errors by parent YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Cluster standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.3 Exploring non-linearities along the supply chain.
In this section we want to explore possible non-linearities along the supply chain, after unbunding
parent demand elasticity over a¢liates downstreamness and controlling for parents positioning, in
this way abandoning the elasticity cuto¤ that Antràs and Chor (2013) identify for identication of
sequential complements and substitutes inputs.
Therefore adopting a quantile regression on the baseline eq. 1, we nd that on the conditional
median reported in Table 12 the main theoretical prediction is conrmed, but only when we make
use of one of the alternative downstreamness metrics that we have at disposal, DuseTuse, whereas
the adoption of the DownMeasure leads to opposite results. As we already noted in Figures 1 and
2, these two measures reported a di¤erent statistical support and skewness in both a¢liates and
parents distribution. The DownMeasure has a narrower standard deviation and is more skewed to
the left. This di¤erence in statistical distribution comes after introducing a weighing system, from
input-output tables, in order to correct for the di¤erences in length of productive chains, as originally
made by Antràs and Chor (2013).
To verify that our results are not due to a di¤erent quality of one metric over another, we go
beyond conditional median regression and look at single quantiles. Hence, a visualization of marginal
e¤ects by quantile helps us in detecting where possible non-linearities arise for both metrics. We
report estimates in Figure 3 (Azevedo, 2011). Note that for parsimony we only draw visual estimates
for coe¢cients on parent downstreamness, its elasticity and their interaction term, ceteris paribus the
other control variables. Hence, we plot in each panel included the estimates along the vertical axis and
the quantiles of a¢liates downstreamness along the horizontal axis. A reference line is also reported
for comparison with simple OLS. Narrow bands of 95% pointwise condence intervals are reported for
both quantile and OLS specications.
We nd that all three terms of the regression equation can register non-linearities over a¢liates
downstreamness, whatever metric we adopt, in some cases even crossing the zeros, hence showing
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Table 12: Quantile regression, results at the conditional median
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
affiliate downstreamness
(Du se Tu se  o r Do w n )
Median reg
and firm
controls
Median reg
fe and firm
controls
Median
reg and
firm
controls
Median
reg fe and
firm
controls
Parent DuseTuse .326*** .361***
(.010) (.008)
Parent Down .592*** .615***
(.013) (.011)
Parent demand elasticity ­.002*** ­.002*** .003*** .002***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Parent demand elasticity*DuseTuse .003*** .002***
(.001) (.001)
Parent demand elasticity*Down ­.005*** ­.004***
(.001) (.001)
(log of) labor productivity .010*** .010*** .010*** .009***
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
(log of) capital intensity ­.013*** ­.010*** ­.015*** ­.014***
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.002)
(log of) size .006*** .005*** .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
(log of) established affiliates ­.005*** ­.002* ­.001 .001
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001)
(log of) age ­.005*** ­.003** ­.002 ­.003
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.002)
multinational group ­.046*** ­.056*** ­.034*** ­.026***
(.009) (.007) (.010) (.009)
contractibility ­.174*** ­.179*** ­.118*** ­.120***
(.014) (.011) (.015) (.014)
rule law ­.024** ­.003
(.012) (.013)
entry cost ­.006*** ­.001
(.001) (.001)
Constant .481*** .325** .239*** .245***
(.018) (.143) (.019) (.011)
Observations 30,342 39,811 30,342 39,811
Country fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a sign reversal. The latter was concealed by OLS estimates, as it averaged out over the a¢liates
distribution.
We can also compute the threshold at which our correlations of interest reverse signs, considering
the rst derivative of elasticity on a¢liate downstreamness. Taking into account the combined marginal
e¤ect of the elasticity alone and in its interaction with downstreamness, while considering the level of
parent downstreamness at that quantile, we estimate a value next to :8. That is, we have a conrmation
of the main theoretical prediction when a¢liates have a value of downstreamness below :8, which is
valid for about 70 percent of our a¢liate-level sample. Above that threshold, however, when a¢liates
are actually located towards the bottom of the supply chain, the elasticity correlations can become
non-signicant or can switch signs, depending on the metrics of downstreamness we adopt.
We cannot exclude that a measurement problem can be responsible for the latter nding, after
using industry-level proxies for both positioning on the supply chain and sensitivity to prices by buyers
of the nal product. Still, we can think of some economic rationales that can explain the peculiarity
of companies located at the very bottom of a supply chain. Most probably, next to nal consumers
we have horizontal rather than vertical integration, that the theoretical model by Antràs and Chor
(2013) is not able to catch. Alternatively, a¢liates at the bottom of the chain can be involved in
completely di¤erent lines of business, reecting a conglomerate nature of the business group to which
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Figure 3: Detecting non-linearities: quantile regressions on a¢liates downstreamness
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5 Conclusion
In this contribution we test at the rm-level the optimal allocation of ownership rights along Global
Value Chains. We nd empirical evidence for the theoretical framework set by Antràs and Chor (2013),
whose main prediction is that vertical integration choices over a sequence of production stages depend
both on the relative position of each intermediate producer, and on the surplus that can be extracted
from the sale of the nal output, on which all the producers along the chain can rely. Indeed, we nd
that if the nal demand elasticity is su¢ciently high, parent companies prefer to engage in vertical
integration of downstream production stages. Further, we nd that parent companies and a¢liates
tend to be located in proximity over a supply chains, while we detect some non-linearities towards
the bottom, after the VIII decile of a¢liates downstreamness distribution. We presume that at the
end of the supply chain, before reaching the nal consumer, we are detecting horizontal rather than
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vertical integration strategies, for which determinants of optimal allocation of property rights can be
di¤erent.
We believe that considering the sequentiality in production stages gets to the heart of modern
organization of production worldwide, when contracts are incomplete and an unbundling of production
tasks is underway, as shared by networks of rms across national borders.
Hence, we are able also to test for some heterogeneity at the rm-level over the value chains, as we
nd that more productive and bigger rms prefer to pick downstream a¢liates. On the other hand,
when controlling for present and past choices of integration, we nd that parent companies controlling
bigger and more complex supply chains can su¤er from some increasing coordination costs, for which
they show a lower propensity to integrate at the margin.
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A Data Appendix
Downstreamness: computed by Antràs and Chor (2013) from the 2002 U.S. IO Tables, after
using the detailed Supplementary Use Table after redenitions issued by the BEA 2002, to obtain
average measures of the relative position of each industry in U.S. production processes. Antràs and
Chor (2013) propose two measures of downstreamness. The rst measure is the ratio of the aggregate
direct use to the aggregate total use (DUseTUse) of a particular industry i s goods, where the direct
use for a pair of industries is the value of goods from industry i directly used by rms in industry j
to produce goods for nal use, while the total use is the value of goods from industry i used either
directly or indirectly in producing industry j s output for nal use. A high value of DUseTUse thus
suggests that most of the contribution of input i tends to occur at relatively downstream production
stages close to nal demand. The second measure of downstreamness (DownMeasure) is a weighted
index of the average position in the value chain at which an industrys output is used, with weights
given by the ratio of the use of that industrys output in that position relative to the total output of
that industry. These measures have been nally averaged over the 6-digit NAICS rev.2007 parent and
a¢liate primary activities.
Demand Elasticity: computed by Antràs and Chor (2013) from U.S. HS10 products import
demand elasticities (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). These are merged with a comprehensive list of
HS10 codes from Pierce and Schott (2012). For each HS10 code missing an elasticity value, they
assigned a value equal to the trade-weighted average elasticity of the available HS10 codes with which
it shared the same rst nine digits. This is done successively up to codes that shared the same rst
two digits, to ll in as many HS10 elasticities as possible. Using the IO-HS concordance provided
by the BEA with the 2002 U.S. I-O Tables, they then take the trade-weighted average of the HS10
elasticities within each IO2002 category. At each stage, the weights used were the total value of U.S.
imports by HS10 code from 1989 to 2006, calculated from Feenstra et al. (2002). There remain 13
IO2002 industries without elasticity values after the above procedure. For these, they assign a value
equal to the weighted average elasticity of the IO2002 codes with which the industry shared the same
rst four digits, or (if the value was still missing) the same rst three digits, using industry output
values as weights. This yielded import elasticities for the industry that sells the input in question ().
These measures have been nally averaged over the 6-digit NAICS 2007 parent primary activities.
Complements: computed from the Demand Elasticity measure. We identify as Sequential Com-
plements industries those with  above the cross-industry median (5.37 for the 437 manufacturing
sectors present in our data), while Sequential Substitutes are the industries below the cross-industry
median.
Capital intensity: computed at parent-level from Orbis database. It is the ratio between xed
assets over number of employees for parent rm j.
Age: computed at parent-level from Orbis database. It is the age of the parent at the year when
choices of integration were undertaken.
Size: computed at parent-level from Orbis database. It is the number of consolidated employees
by parent rm j.
Productivity: computed at parent-level from Orbis database. It is the value added over number
of employees for each parent rm j.
A¢liatesnumber: computed at parent-level from the Orbis database. It is the number of already
established a¢liates as controlled by parent rm j before choices of integration occurred.
International Group: computed at parent-level from the Orbis database. It is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the parent rm j owns at least one foreign a¢liate and 0 otherwise.
20
Investment: computed at parent-level from the Orbis database. It is a dummy variable equal to
1 if parent rm j has integrated an a¢liate from 2004 to 2012 and 0 otherwise.
Contractibility: we source from Antràs and Chor (2013), who computed from the 2002 U.S. IO
Tables, following the methodology of Nunn (2007) For each IO2002 industry, they rst calculate the
fraction of HS10 constituent codes classied by Rauch (1999) as neither reference-priced nor traded on
an organized exchange, under Rauchs liberal classication. The original Rauch classication is at
the level of SITC Rev. 2 products. These were associated with HS10 codes using a mapping derived
from U.S. imports in Feenstra et al. (2002). The authors took one minus this value as a measure of
the own contractibility of each IO2002 industry. This measure we average over the 6-digit NAICS
2007 a¢liate i primary activities.
Entry costs: we source country entry costs from the World Bank - Doing Business. They built
it using data on the number of procedures, number of days, and cost (as a percentage of income per
capita) required to start a business. We average over 2003-2005 for each a¢liate i and host country c.
Rule of law: from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2011). The annual
index is linearly rescaled from its original range [ 2:5; 2:5], in order to lie in a range [0; 1], and averaged
over the period 2004-2010 for each a¢liates country of origin. This reects perceptions on the extent
to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, especially in the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the role of police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence.
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